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 Medical Overtesting 
 The phenomenon of medical overuse in general and specifi cally medi-
cal overtesting is well-known and harmful to both the patient and the 
health-care system ( Boland, Wollan, and Silverstein 1996 ;  Shapiro and 
Greenfi eld 1987 ;  Bishop, Federman, and Keyhani 2010 ;  Greenberg and 
Green 2014 ;  Morgan et al. 2015 ). It is estimated that between 10 and 
30 percent of all care is overuse, depending on the defi nition and method 
( Berwick and Hackbarth 2012 ;  Morgan et al. 2015 ;  Smith 1991 ). Over-
testing is just one kind of overuse, but a kind I argue is different from 
its siblings. Unlike other forms of overuse, it is not obvious we should 
focus signifi cant effort into reducing it. Because minority groups (specifi -
cally black Americans) are liable to be victims of medical underuse and 
physicians’ perceptions of underuse and overuse in individual cases can 
be affected by unconscious bias, these groups do not suffer the harms of 
overtesting in the same way as others. Furthermore, race-neutral poli-
cies aimed at reducing undertesting might further lower treatment they 
already receive, increasing already-existent health inequities. Finally, if 
we are to reduce it via some policy, we should strongly consider race-
conscious policies. Before I can argue either point, more must be said 
about overuse and overtesting. 
 The Nature of Overuse and Overtesting 
 The reasons overuse occurs are hard to parse. According to some stud-
ies, defensive medicine plays some role in this—doctors feel pressure to 
do more than necessary to avoid liability, including testing ( Greenberg 
and Green 2014 ;  Mello, Chandra, Gawande, and Studdert 2010 ;  Bishop, 
Federman, and Keyhani 2010 ). Other and more recent studies indicate 
that low-value care (some of which includes preventative care, such as 
medical tests) is driven primarily by local practices, patient expectations, 
or is idiosyncratic to certain diagnoses ( Reid, Rabideau, and Sood 2016 ; 
 Morgan et al. 2018 ). Medical overuse increases the cost of healthcare, 
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puts the patients’ health at risk, and reduces the amount of time avail-
able with medical professionals for everyone ( Greenberg and Green 
2014 ;  Mello, Chandra, Gawande, and Studdert 2010 ;  Thomasian 2014 ). 
This gives us strong reasons to try to reduce medical overuse, of which 
overtesting is a part ( Morgan et al. 2018 ;  Mello, Chandra, Gawande, 
and Studdert 2010 ). Although awareness of medical overuse has greatly 
increased, practice remains largely unaffected ( Morgan et al. 2015 ;  Mor-
gan et al. 2018 ). 
 Part of the issue is located in the defi nitions and concepts used to try 
and probe the problem. Overuse and underuse in a medical setting are 
typically thought of as paradigm cases of medical error. Medical error is 
conceptually broad. The Institute of Medicine report on medical error 
defi nes it as “Failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or 
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim” ( Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson 
2000 , 210). It can be usefully thought of as the result of a knowledge-
based or practice-based mistake in a medical setting.2 As Morgan et al. 
point out, there are multiple overlapping concepts used to describe medi-
cal overuse: overutilization, overmedicalization, low value care, and so 
on ( 2015 ). 3 Additionally, there are related concepts like overdiagnosis, 
overtreatment, and overtesting that are commonly used ( Morgan et al. 
2015 ). Many have adopted the Institute of Medicine’s defi nition of medi-
cal overuse as “care in the absence of a clear medical basis for use or 
when the benefi t of therapy does not outweigh the risk” ( Institute of 
Medicine 2001 ). While I intend to focus on overtesting shortly, we should 
fi rst critically examine this defi nition. 
 The primary issue with the defi nition is that it does not distinguish 
between two different readings: one is read as subjective while the other 
reading is objective. Suppose a physician examines a patient and their 
perception of the patient identifi es symptoms that point toward a heart 
attack. The physician now has a medical basis for care. Suppose also that 
one of the symptoms that the medical fi eld identifi es as a symptom for 
heart attacks does not actually correlate with heart attack rates, although 
the medical community is unaware of this. Finally, suppose that the care 
involves managing this same problematic symptom. Now we have a case 
in which the physician believes they have a medical basis for care, but, 
objectively speaking, the benefi t of therapy does not outweigh the risk. 
Under the defi nition cited earlier, this seems as if it is both a case of over-
use and not a case of overuse. 
 To understand how to resolve this issue, we can draw an analogy to jus-
tifi ed beliefs and true beliefs. It is commonly accepted among epistemolo-
gists that someone may be justifi ed in holding a false belief. For example, 
someone might be justifi ed in believing that they saw a zebra when they 
in fact only saw a cleverly disguised donkey ( Alspector-Kelly 2019 ), or 
believing “laudable pus” to be healing ( Nuland 2011 ). If “medical basis” 
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is anything like justifi ed belief, then it is possible to have a medical basis 
despite the therapy’s actual costs and benefi ts being net negative. 
 It is likely that the defi nition of medical overuse is consistent, treating 
both concepts as subjective, 4 but it is important to show that we rely 
on this subjective reading whether or not the Institute of Medicine con-
fl ated the issues. When determining how to reduce overuse, vacillating 
between readings may seriously hamper efforts. A brief foreshadowing 
is illustrative: bias can cause one person to perceive a situation in a 
different way than another; if there is no medical basis for care given 
a racially biased evaluation, then the physician could believe they are 
entirely justifi ed in withholding care when they in fact should provide 
it. While an objective reading of “medical basis” might help us fi nd 
low-value care elsewhere, it seems to systematically overlook catching 
instances of subjective bias when evaluating whether something is low-
value care by the physician. 
 This discussion generalizes to overuse’s drivers. Overtesting specifi -
cally seems to have similar conceptual joints: physicians may overtest 
despite their perception that it is not necessary, or the community may 
learn that the benefi ts of a test do not outweigh the cost and fail to keep 
its members testing with best practices. The upshot is that we now can 
identify roughly two ways overtesting might be identifi ed: one in which 
a physician accurately identifi es a case in which “[testing] in the absence 
of a clear medical basis for use or when the benefi t of therapy does not 
outweigh the risk,” and one in which a physician  believes they have iden-
tifi ed such a case, but are incorrect for reasons including unconscious 
bias. Both of these are likely phenomenologically indistinguishable to the 
physician at the time. 5
 As with overuse, medical overtesting is regarded as harmful to the 
patient and the health-care system. On this basis, there has been a push 
to rather bluntly reduce medical overtesting ( Hendee 2010 ;  Morgan et al. 
2015 ;  Morgan, Dhruva, Wright, and Korenstein 2016 ). Once we learn 
that we use imaging tests much more often than necessary, physicians 
are encouraged to cut back on the use of such tests (such as the MRI or 
the CT scan) in addition to major systemic changes to liability and non-
legal fi nancial incentives ( Hendee 2010 ). Moreover, the community-wide 
push to reduce medical overuse and waste likely seeps into individual 
practice. 6 Notably, many of the anti-overtesting policies argues against 
here are race-neutral, which often contributes to their blunt nature with 
regard to problems of racial disparities. I argue that we have assumed 
too quickly; the basis on which we have made the leap from overtesting 
to its reduction does not have a strong foundation. Characterizing harm 
in such a broad way neglects an important factor: racial minorities 7 are 
not harmed by overtesting in the same way as other groups. To see this 
more clearly, we should review some major points about medical racism. 
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 Black Experience and Medical Racism 
 It is benefi cial to begin with the facts of racial disparities and center the 
discussion at the margins before considering policies ( Airhihubuwa and 
Liburd 2006 ). The history of the United States is plagued with racism. Not 
only has intentional, interpersonal racism led to horrifi c acts, racial ani-
mus has created structures of power and attitudes that affect its victims in 
ways that may no longer involve interpersonal racists at all ( Bonilla-Silva 
2017 ). Hardly any aspect of society has been left untouched. 8 Medicine 
has fared no better. For more than a thousand years, black biology and 
black intellectual ability have been denigrated or assumed to be inferior.9
From Galen to Avicenna to Carl Linnaeus, the luminaries and found-
ers of medicine have diagnosed darker-skinned peoples with primitivity, 
savagery, stupidity, or categorized them as wholly subhuman ( McBride 
2018 ;  Byrd and Clayton 2001 ). As each new scientifi c theory was devel-
oped, racism was either already present or quickly twisted the theory to 
support itself. For example, it was not long before Darwinian physicians 
and natural scientists proclaimed that they had found the missing link 
between apes and humans: black people ( Drake 1987 ;  Byrd 2000 ). 
 This inevitably led to healthcare that was entirely inadequate and often 
pernicious. A lexicon of “Negro diseases” was developed ( Byrd and Clay-
ton 2001 ). Almshouses, medical centers for the “undeserving poor” were 
built to house black patients ( Rosenberg 1987 ). Hospitals denied service 
to any but whites or would abuse black patients ( Rosenberg 1987 ). It goes 
without saying that medical training was an exclusively white privilege. 
 The Tuskegee experiment is illustrative of these attitudes within the 
medical fi eld. In the government-approved and government-funded 
study, 622 poor black men were monitored to study the progression of 
syphilis. Despite developing an effective cure during the study, the men 
did not receive any such treatment. Furthermore, none of the men were 
informed of their illness or of the true timeline of the study. None of them 
were ever given penicillin, an effective cure for the disease, during the 
experiment. This study was not halted until 1972, only after its horrors 
were leaked to the press. 
 This racist history has not merely infl uenced the present day—it is con-
tinuous with it. As Vanessa Gamble put it, “the problem we must face is 
not just the shadow of Tuskegee but the shadow of racism that so pro-
foundly affects the lives and beliefs of all people in this country” ( Gamble 
1997 ). Many accept that there was racism, even medical racism, up to the 
1920s ( Hoberman 2012 ;  Byrd and Clayton 2001 ;  Smedley, Nelson, and 
Stith 2003 ). The Tuskegee experiment is emblematic of the continuing 
racism up till its halt in 1972. But this was not the end: 
 More than 600 studies have documented racial and ethnic differ-
ences in health care dating back at least to the 1980s. These studies 
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suggested that racial and ethnic differences refl ect, in part, underuse 
by black patients who fail to receive these procedures when their use 
is clinically appropriate. 
 (Jha et al. 2005, 690;  Hoberman 2012 , 235) 
 In 1999, Schulman et al. found that black patients were less likely to 
be referred for cardiac catheterization than white patients, and black 
women less than white men, white women, or black men ( Schulman et al. 
1999 ). This revelation sent shockwaves through the medical community, 
but anyone familiar with the data or the history of medical racism was 
not surprised ( Byrd 2001 ). It is not that we are shaking off the remnants 
of racism from the Civil War, or the Civil Rights movement, or anything 
of the sort ( McBride 2018 ). We are actively—although perhaps uncon-
sciously—engaged in the same, continuous, pejorative, and centuries-
long history that has so badly wronged black people in America. 
 Modern medical racism may be less intentional, but it still exists in 
both interpersonal and structural forms ( Hoberman 2012 ;  Gee and Ford 
2011 ;  Massey and Sampson 2009 ). While intentional interpersonal rac-
ism is evil, structural racism and unconscious biases lead to true medical 
error, which perhaps entails less blame. I will quickly survey some ways 
these racial divides occur and why doctors propagate them, even if unin-
tentionally, through two fruitful examples. First, physicians refer black 
patients for cardiac catheterizations less often than their white counter-
parts ( CDC 2017 ). Second, black women have incredibly high maternal 
mortality rates in comparison to white women ( CDC 2017 ). These exam-
ples are not just paradigm instances of medical racism, but illuminative 
examples, as we will see. 
 In a well-publicized study, Schulman et al. showed unequivocally that 
clinical outcomes are affected by race ( Schulman et al. 1999 ). 10 Physicians 
are signifi cantly less likely to refer a patient for cardiac catheterizations if 
the patient is black, and even less likely to do so if the patient is a black 
woman. Although the study leaves open why the physicians did so, John 
Hoberman details how this sort of medical malpractice can come about. 
Medical “gossip,” still thrives in the medical fi eld simply by fi ltering 
patients and experiences with them through the doctor’s personal beliefs 
( Hoberman 2012 , 12–13). 11 Unfortunately, doctors’ personal beliefs do 
not vary much from the public when it comes to racial attitudes. Just like 
the public, “whites have largely abandoned principled racism. 12 . . .[but] 
they have not necessarily given up negative racial stereotypes” or other 
negative attitudes about people of color ( Hoberman 2012 , 12–13;  Mas-
sey and Sampson 2009 ). 
 This has been further corroborated by studies about pain treatment. 
It has been well-documented that black patients’ pain is both underesti-
mated and undertreated by the medical community, even in cases involv-
ing children (Smedley, Nelson, and Stith 2013;  Anderson, Green, and 
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Payne 2009 ;  Cintron and Morrison 2006 ; Freeman and Payne 2009). 
The causes of this might be a number of factors, but one of the best 
explanations is the actual content of medical professionals’ beliefs about 
different races. Many of the researchers studying the phenomenon argue 
that doctors simply assume that black patients experience less pain than 
white patients. Consider a study by Staton et al.: patients were asked 
to report how much pain they were currently experiencing, and doctors 
were to report how much pain they thought the patients were experienc-
ing. The mismatch was quite large: black patients’ pain was signifi cantly 
underestimated compared to non-black patients (47 percent to 33.5 per-
cent;  Staton et al. 2007 ). 
 This fi ts in with other fi ndings adjacent to this point. Many people 
simply believe biological falsities about black bodies, and medical pro-
fessionals are no exception. Many believe black people are biologically 
more athletic as a result of natural selection or even from breeding during 
slavery ( Hoberman 1997 ;  Morning 2011 ). In a study in 2016, white med-
ical students and residents were found to hold biologically false beliefs 
about the black body. In this case, their beliefs centered on pain tolerance 
( Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, and Oliver 2016 ). 13 The focus was not just to 
see if there were widespread false beliefs, but if they led to different treat-
ment recommendations in which the symptoms of black patients were 
downplayed—which they did. Although these beliefs do not necessarily 
constitute racism, they can and do have impacts on how black people 
are treated and also correlate with acceptance of racial disparities and 
outcomes as unproblematic (Williams and Eberhardt 2008). 14
 Given the data cited here, it seems that we have a fairly straightfor-
ward explanation for why treatment and recommendations might differ 
between white and black patients: physicians falsely believe that black 
patients simply aren’t experiencing what they profess to be experienc-
ing. 15 If patients are experiencing severe chest pain, this is a reason to 
refer them for heart treatment. If the physician believes patients are only 
experiencing mild pain, then there is much less reason for the refer-
ral. Physicians systematically underestimate the pain of black patients; 
therefore, it should be no surprise that black patients often receive less 
treatment when pain is a signifi cant symptom. Of course, there are other 
explanations along this line. Consider that, for a long time, doctors did 
not think that African-Americans could develop myocardial infarction (a 
certain kind of heart disease;  Hoberman 2012 , 12), or that they believed 
black people have fewer nerve endings ( Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, and 
Oliver 2016 ), or any number of other false biological beliefs that many 
medical professionals hold ( Hoffman, Trawalter, Axt, and Oliver 2016 ; 
 Hoberman 2012 ). 16 What is important is that a signifi cant amount of 
undertreatment is almost certainly due to  biological beliefs that, unbe-
knownst to the physicians and other medical personnel who hold them, 
are false. 
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 W. E. B. DuBois was one of the fi rst to study the white/black disparity 
in infant mortality rates sociologically, and from which racial injustice 
is easily inferred ( DuBois 1899 ). At the time, the black infant mortal-
ity rate was 340/1000 babies whereas the white infant mortality rate 
was 217/1000 babies. Although both have decreased signifi cantly, the 
disparity between black and white infant mortality rates has remained 
steadfast. Today, a black baby is more than twice as likely to die than 
a white baby—11.3/1000 compared to 4.9/1000, a statistic that has 
recently received media attention ( Villarosa 2018 ;  Roeder 2019 ). Inti-
mately related is the maternal mortality rate, which has its own, even 
more staggering disparity. The white maternal mortality rate is currently 
12.4 deaths per 100,000 white pregnant women compared to 40.0 
deaths per 100,000 black pregnant women ( CDC 2017 ). Easy alterna-
tive explanations such as class or education do not explain the data: 
black women still die at higher rates than white women even when they 
have similar educational backgrounds ( Schoendorf, Hogue, Kleinman, 
and Rowley 1992 ). 17 
 A controversial explanation that has garnered considerable interest has 
been “weathering,” a term that describes the effects of toxic stress caused 
by structural and institutional racism on a black woman’s body, which 
increases the likelihood of high blood pressure, pre-eclampsia, and so on 
( Geronimus 1987 ,  1992 ;  Geronimus, Hicken, Keene, and Bound 2006 ; 
 Kramer and Hogue 2009 ). Of course, any regular symptom increase is 
further complicated and exacerbated by pregnancy, which only worsens 
the consequences of weathering. There are at least two good reasons to 
think the weathering hypothesis is true. Consider privileged or normally 
stressed women (e.g., white women in America) who have maternal mor-
tality risks that resemble inverse bell curves—higher risk during teen 
years, then lower risk during years of prime health before rising again 
with age. Because there is more time for toxic stress to affect her body, 
the weathering hypothesis predicts that women who have weathered 
stress from racism will have a steadily increasing maternal mortality risk 
( Geronimus 1987 ). This turns out to be true: it is actually  less risky —
with regard to the mother’s life—to have a child as a teenager if one is a 
black woman than to have a child in one’s 20s ( Geronimus 1987 ). Sec-
ond, allostatic load score analyses measure the amount of the toxic chem-
icals stress can leave behind in one’s body ( Geronimus, Hicken, Keene, 
and Bound 2006 ). As weathering predicts, we fi nd much higher levels of 
these chemicals in older black bodies ( Geronimus, Hicken, Keene, and 
Bound 2006 ). 
 Weathering links the disparate numbers to black experience—specifi -
cally, the medical community’s continuing ignorance of it. Not only do 
medical personnel hold false biological beliefs about black people, they 
also ignore the reports of black people’s symptoms and experiences, 
consequently poisoning the chances of equitable and fair treatment. 
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Black women are emblematic of this, as the evidence cited earlier shows 
( Geronimus 1987 ,  1992 ;  Geronimus, Hicken, Keene, and Bound 2006 ; 
 Kramer and Hogue 2009 ). 18
 Not only are black women more likely to experience the complica-
tions associated with weathering, but their experiences are discredited 
and their symptoms downplayed or ignored. Serena Williams’s almost 
lethal experience after childbirth catalyzed some popular press of the 
well-documented disparities in the maternal mortality rate. After deliver-
ing her baby Olympia, Williams experienced several serious symptoms 
and told a nurse outside her room that she thought she was experienc-
ing a blood clot, asking for blood thinner and tests. Her experience was 
at fi rst dismissed—she must be confused from the pain killers. Williams 
continued to insist on testing, and they relented, allowing an ultrasound 
which showed nothing. Williams persisted and eventually secured a CT 
scan, which showed several blood clots ( Roeder 2019 ;  Villarosa 2018 ). 
 Medical education is no immunization to this dismissal. Shalon Irving 
was an epidemiologist at the CDC and worked specifi cally on racial and 
other health inequities. Despite her concern about her alarming post-
partum symptoms, she was reassured that her symptoms were normal. 
Hours after her latest appointment, she collapsed and died ( Roeder 2019 ; 
 Villarosa 2018 ). 
 On top of the black maternal mortality rate, a tragedy all on its own, 
there are obvious downstream effects. The children must be raised with-
out their mother, which means their family is missing additional income, 
community involvement, or the loving care of a mother ( McLanahan and 
Sandefur 1994 ). These and other results might explain why being raised 
by a single parent is often correlated with worse health outcomes ( Jen-
nings and Sheldon 1985 ). 
 This is by no means all of the evidence for the medical community’s 
ignorance of black women’s lived experience. Take the fact that 26 per-
cent of black women meet their birth attendants for the fi rst time during 
childbirth compared to about 18 percent of white women. Black women 
are also less likely to have obstetrician-gynecologists as their birth attend-
ants than white women ( Declercq et al. 2013 ). 19 All of this is just a tiny 
snapshot of what could be said about the lived experience of being black 
in America, but these two examples center the discussion around con-
cerns of undertreatment, dismissal, and distrust that motivate the argu-
ment to abandon certain policies opposed to overtesting. 
 Medical Overtesting and Racial Distrust 
 Black people in America have had little reason to trust white people in 
positions of power over them. They have been captured, held, and forced 
to work against their will by and for white people. Later, almost any 
person of authority would abuse it in one way or another or else totally 
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misunderstand the condition and needs of black people. This has been no 
different in the medical fi eld. With such a large disconnect in understand-
ing between black patients and white doctors further complicated by his-
torical and present medical abuse, it is easy to see why distrust between 
black patients and white doctors would grow. We have evidence of this 
distrust between “free” black patients and white doctors from as far back 
as the early 1900s, when white doctors’ complaints about treating black 
patients center on, among other things, black patients not coming to the 
doctor until their illness had already progressed signifi cantly or not fol-
lowing the doctors’ orders ( Douglas 1926 , 736–737;  Hoberman 2012 , 
23;  Airhihenbuwa, Ford, and Iwelunmor 2013 ). 
 Today, medical professionals often feel that this distrust is unwar-
ranted. “ I nor anyone I know has done anything to earn your distrust,” 
or “ I didn’t participate in the Tuskegee study,” can often be sentiments 
expressed by doctors who are subjects of distrust to their patients. 20 Nev-
ertheless, individuals usually inherit their values from their community. 
A history of medical abuse and neglect has shaped the community of 
black Americans to be wary of the medical profession ( Gamble 1993 ). 
Although it is partially explainable this way, it is also misleading. Rac-
ism has become less conscious and more structural, but it is still ongoing 
( Gamble 1993 ,  1997 ;  Hoberman 2012 ;  Massey and Sampson 2009 ). So, 
for both historical considerations of abuse and present considerations of 
medical racism, it seems racial distrust has been well-earned by the medi-
cal community. 21
 I have no new policies that I will advocate here, but we can retain an 
existing practice that might prevent further medical neglect: overtesting. 
With this in mind, we can turn to principles of justice to see how these 
goods should be distributed. 
 A common proposal to combat overtesting is to discourage doctors 
from testing in cases in which the physician judges the test to be low 
in value or high in risk (for an example in medical imaging, see  Hen-
dee et al. 2010 ). The measures for this are not merely individual. The 
medical community must push to educate physicians on the tests that 
are the most wasteful, that are the lowest in value, and so on ( Morgan 
et al. 2015 ;  Morgan, Dhruva, Wright, and Korenstein 2016 ;  Morgan 
et al. 2017 ;  Morgan et al. 2018 ). Furthermore, there should be structural 
change. One path suggested is eliminating measures that enforce overt-
esting, such as reducing the need for defensive medicine or eliminating 
fi nancial kickbacks from ordering tests ( Berwick and Hackbarth 2012 ; 
 Mello, Chandra, Gawande, and Studdert 2010 ). This solution would 
only decrease the already-reduced care given to black Americans given 
the racial biases of physicians in the United States. Even if overtesting is 
harmful for non-black Americans (or even for all patients), the reduction 
in appropriate testing that would result from implementing this policy is 
unacceptable. So, we should not bluntly discourage most overtesting of 
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patients by physicians and therefore avoid increasing the high incidence 
of harmful medical error infl icted on certain racial minorities. 22
 There are myriad ways for overtesting to occur. Overtesting can be 
administering the same test more times than necessary, administering 
different tests but that have little or no reason to suspect will discover 
anything of importance, and so on. In the discussion that follows, I want 
to focus on two particular kinds of overtesting. The fi rst is not a case of 
actual overtesting, but instead a case of  perceived overtesting in which a 
doctor has formed a belief that further tests are not necessary or help-
ful (perhaps because of harmful stereotypes) when they in fact would be 
helpful or are necessary. In this case, perhaps a physician has some mis-
taken perception (due to bias or bad training) that causes them to evalu-
ate the situation in such a way that they decrease the odds of a certain 
cause, taking it out of the range of needing to be tested for. 23 Because of 
this mistaken evaluation, the physician then decides to withhold the test 
in order to reduce overtesting. 24, 25 The second is  actual overtesting, in 
which the helpfulness and necessity of the tests coincide with the doctor’s 
belief that they would not be helpful or are not necessary. In this case, 
the physician evaluates the situation as not providing a medical basis 
for overtesting  and is correct . If both cases turn out to be benefi cial for 
oppressed minority groups, then we have reason to apply principles of 
distributive and restorative justice. Consider the following case: 
Actual Overtesting: A black male is anxious about a few of his symp-
toms. The physician informs the patient that there is no reason to 
test the patient for any further underlying causes, but the physician 
administers the tests anyway after the patient persists. The patient is 
relieved at the test results and returns home. The doctor has shown 
a willingness to listen to the patient even when there is no reason to 
think the tests will be helpful or necessary. 26
 There are two benefi ts of actual overtesting: (1) the patient’s personal 
medical anxieties are relieved; and (2) there is some restoration of trust 
between the patient and the doctor. (1) is not usually considered to be 
suffi ciently weighty to favor overtesting, since similar anxieties are pre-
sent in white patients to the same or nearly the same degree, but few feel 
this justifi es the practice of overtesting. Additionally, some test results 
will not return to the patient for signifi cant periods of time, during which 
heightened medical anxiety or other negative mental states can be pre-
sent. Thus, (1) is not suffi cient for justifying overtesting on an individual 
basis. 
 Restoration of trust has not been seriously considered by the medical 
community, perhaps because most do not believe it is in need of restora-
tion or have dismissed it prematurely. There are a few reasons to think it 
would restore trust. One important reason is that it relieves anxiety not 
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present or not present to the same degree for other patients: fear of with-
held care. Because of the long history of withholding care to black Ameri-
cans, the appearance of doing so is particularly harmful ( Jones 1993 ; 
 Gamble 1993 ,  1997 ;  Krakauer and Truog 1997 ). A second reason is the 
trust shown by the physician fi rst by listening and believing the patient. 
An additional consideration is that the transparency of the interaction 
helps in more than one way, both from a trust-building perspective and 
to better acquire informed-consent when the test is administered. Trust 
restoration is not present in the “usual” consideration of this problem 
because it is  not present in cases involving overtesting and white patients. 
Despite this being a case of actual overtesting, it seems  prima facie good 
for black communities. Perhaps this can be outweighed by other consid-
erations (such as driving up costs), but this and other objections will be 
addressed later. Consider a different case: 
Perceived Overtesting: A black female is anxious about a few of her 
symptoms. The physician has formed the belief that her symptoms 
are not the result of anything serious but, aware that she might be 
misperceiving the situation due to bias, agrees to extra tests regard-
less. The tests reveal that the patient has an underlying condition 
causing the symptoms. The doctor orders the proper treatment, and 
the condition is resolved without complication. 
 Like the previous case, the doctor has shown humility and awareness 
of racial bias in medical practice through her willingness to be open to 
something she missed regardless of the outcome of the tests. Further-
more, if something is found on the tests, the patient is greatly helped by 
the medical community rather than greatly harmed (as would happen 
if no test had been run). 27 Therefore, cases of perceived overtesting that 
nevertheless get “over-tested” can be extremely benefi cial to people and 
communities of color. Furthermore, we have good reason to think there 
are a great number of perceived overtesting events given the arc of medi-
cal history in the United States. Consider again the cases of Serena Wil-
liams and Shalon Irving. In perceived overtesting, the result is a welcome 
one, but consider the resistance Williams and Irving received in response 
to their concerns, and the lethal result if they are ultimately denied fur-
ther testing and care. There is also harder evidence, such as how black 
women were less likely than white women to receive testing for high 
blood sugar in a postpartum visit among women with chronic or gesta-
tional diabetes ( Declercq et al. 2013 ). 28
 Perhaps more importantly is the harm prevented, however. Physi-
cians who are encouraged to cut back on medical overtesting will be 
looking for occasions to cut back on what they perceive as unnecessary 
testing. Because both actual and perceived overtesting are phenomeno-
logically indistinguishable to the physician at the time of deliberation, 
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the physician will view both as candidate situations for withholding test-
ing. Withholding testing in a case of perceived overtesting can be a great 
harm, medically and within the context of racial distrust regarding with-
holding care. Thus, the worry here is not merely losing the extra good 
that may come from overtesting, but also causing great harm by encour-
aging physicians to cut back on tests they perceive to be unnecessary or 
unlikely to help despite their necessity. In fact, Williams’s experience is 
paradigmatic of the harm described in this chapter. There is a push to 
reduce the use of the CT scan due to its fi nancial cost and its high radia-
tion level ( Hendee et al. 2010 ). Medical personnel thereby become more 
reluctant to use the test. 29 Couple this with unconscious racial biases such 
as over-reporting pain and dismissal of black experience and one can 
easily see how black women can end up untested and untreated in life-
threatening circumstances. 
 There are also cases of testing that do not appear harmful if over-
looked. Does this change the calculus of harm? Yes. But in every case, 
some harm occurs—if a test is justifi ed based on the presentation of the 
symptoms, then it is overall  better for the test to be performed than not. 
Even in cases of the least amount of  physical harm, there appears to be 
a certain amount of dignitary harm that comes from not respecting the 
patient by under-testing them. But many tests  are intended to help diag-
nose serious health problems, and so the risk of great harm is present in 
many cases. If the characterization or policy discouraging overtesting is 
not suffi ciently nuanced, then cases of perceived overtesting will go with-
out the necessary testing, causing serious harm. 30 In fact, cases of actual 
overtesting can be unequivocally bad, and yet pursuing policies that seek 
to reduce overtesting can still be outweighed by the risks of cutting back 
on necessary tests in cases of perceived overtesting. 
 We have just analyzed the two possibilities in a case of overtesting: 
actual overtesting and perceived overtesting. In one case, merely the act 
of testing to alleviate race-based anxiety helps to alleviate the overall 
phenomenon of racial distrust of the medical community, even if it is at 
some cost to the doctor or the health-care system at large. In the other 
case, overtesting actually prevents harm from occurring to the patient, 
benefi tting everyone involved  and restoring trust between medical and 
black communities. 31 Notably, it does not matter whether the overtest-
ing is actual or perceived; racial trust is restored. Also noteworthy is the 
possibility of serious harm if racist medical mythology leads to higher 
incidence of perceived overtesting and the requisite tests are not adminis-
tered. There are goods at stake in both cases, then, for people and com-
munities of color. Overtesting that discovers disease, as well as restores 
trust, is a very great good and plausibly quite commonplace. 32, 33 As men-
tioned before, however, even if actual overtesting is certainly bad, the 
harms of perceived overtesting can still be great enough to outweigh the 
benefi ts of policies aimed at reducing overtesting. 
15032-3184d-1pass-r02.indd   132 9/23/2019   12:39:14 PM
Medical Overtesting and Racial Distrust 133
 Cost-Benefi t Analysis of Overtesting 
 Having argued that there are benefi ts to overtesting, I turn now to 
whether these benefi ts outweigh the costs of permitting medical over-
testing to continue. First, consider the benefi cial effects. We have seen 
that a confl uence of factors including dismissal of black experience, false 
biological beliefs, and the push to reduce overtesting can result in what 
I have called perceived overtesting, in which a physician, due to evalu-
ative mistakes or unconscious biases, believes testing would not be of 
suffi cient help when in fact it would be medically appropriate to test. 
Failing to utilize tests in cases of perceived overtesting can result in great 
harm to the patient, and this harm becomes racialized if the patients are 
disproportionately black. Racialized harm is an especially bad kind of 
harm, one that should be avoided even at the cost of some net gains. 34
Furthermore, current policies advocating for the reduction of overtesting 
will only discourage administration of tests in cases of perceived overt-
esting. Knowing this, utilizing tests in cases of perceived overtesting is a 
great good. We have also seen that, even in cases of actual-overtesting, 
there is good to be gained. Not only does the patient herself feel relieved, 
but this contributes to the much greater good of building trust between 
the medical community and communities of color. 
 Next, let’s consider the costs. The fi rst two are individual costs to over-
testing. Considering people of color are often less well-off or impover-
ished (mostly due to previous racist treatment both interpersonally and 
structurally), it seems that medical bills could be far too expensive for 
most poor people of color. This would be a strong reason to  not order 
tests that would appear to be unnecessary, since the bill could ruin their 
life just as well as the disease. Second, it is well-known that radiation has 
several negative effects: it is a carcinogen, can cause tissue hardening, 
scarring, discoloration, and so on. Receiving too many radiation-based 
tests could harm a patient ( FDA 2017 ;  Thomasian 2014 ). The com-
puted tomography (CT) scan is a fl agrant offender on this front. Because 
CT scans are quick and data-rich, they have become commonplace in 
emergency rooms, but its radiation dosage is the equivalent of 200 chest 
x-rays ( FDA 2017 ;  Thomasian 2014 ). There is also an increase in costs of 
healthcare overall when there is a climate of overtesting. Because insur-
ance companies foot most of the bills, they will pass that bill onto their 
clients, increasing premiums (or taxes, if healthcare is socialized). Finally, 
we must consider the cost to those who would  not suffer race-specifi c 
harms if overtesting were bluntly discouraged but  would still bear the 
burdens of overtesting. In order to weigh these considerations properly, 
let’s consider each in turn. 
 When patients enter the emergency room, they can refuse almost any 
test or care. Patients are informed of the risks and costs of each test; 
otherwise, the physician would not have obtained informed consent. 
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Therefore, we can hold the variable of the patient understanding the  cost
of overtesting constant. 35 Hence, there are two possibilities that describe 
patients in cases of individual harm caused by overtesting. The fi rst is 
a misestimate of the benefi ts of the test. In these cases, the patient just 
does not understand the chances of a successful test. 36 Alternatively, 
the patient may accurately estimate the chances of a successful test and 
nevertheless thinks it is worth it, despite differing medical opinion (e.g., 
from opponents of unnecessary testing). The second case is easy to deal 
with: patients are not impermissibly harmed by overtesting because they 
would, given their values, prefer the test. In other words, there is not 
any harm present we would not countenance in any other medical situa-
tion, especially given the commitment to the value of autonomy in medi-
cal environments. Pursuing aggressive, almost-certainly-futile life-saving 
therapy is a harm to the patient, but it is a harm we allow the patient to 
pursue. Overtesting is almost certainly less of a harm than aggressive-yet-
futile therapy or dying after months unconscious on a ventilator at an 
advanced age. 
 The fi rst case might seem harder to parse at fi rst, but notice that, while 
overtesting might harm them in some way, the true solution is better 
communication about the benefi ts of the test. If they are misestimating 
just how unlikely it is, then the onus is on the physician (or medical 
personnel explaining the test’s benefi ts) to communicate more clearly, 
lest we receive mere uninformed consent. 37 This sort of analysis resolves 
concerns about both the cost of testing on one’s health (radiation risks to 
one’s health versus health benefi ts of the test results) and one’s fi nancial 
health (monetary cost versus health benefi ts of the test results). 38 Still, 
there is a concern about how this communication should be fi xed. If the 
physician has unconscious biases, how does the explanation of their men-
tal state help the patient? Will it not have the same bias and therefore fail 
to communicate the risks and benefi ts? 
 While this is a serious concern, it is not unique to overtesting. Once 
again, this threatens informed consent in our medical systems in totality. 
Still, there is hope that simple measures aimed at improving informed 
consent might help—the physician might have to rethink their assess-
ment of the patient’s pain, or confront the fact that their evaluation of 
the patient is at odds with the patients’ testimony, or the odd explanation 
may indicate to the patient that there is something fi shy going on. 39, 40
 Beyond the interpersonal case, there are issues that do not concern the 
individual patient weighing the costs and benefi ts. The third part of the 
concern about overtesting involved the fi nancial situation broadly con-
strued. Although the earlier analysis should deal with both issues, it is 
worth pointing out that there are alternatives to depriving patients of med-
ical care when they cannot afford it. Programs such as Public Aid, Medi-
care, Medicaid, and so on help the poor afford medical costs. Should these 
prove insuffi cient, it does not seem as if the climate of overtesting is the 
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obvious change to make. One alternative is to make the case for different 
health-care systems. Drawing on this analysis, one can argue that the poor 
should not suffer consequences of perceived overtesting simply because 
they are poor, especially when their poverty might be due to racist insti-
tutions or history. 41 The analysis provided here strongly supports crucial 
premises in traditional arguments for universal access to healthcare. 42,  43
 The fi nal two considerations run parallel. There are those—such as 
wealthy, white men—who would  not be harmed by a blunt solution to 
overtesting but  would be harmed by the continuance of overtesting. These 
burdens might include personal fi nancial problems, personal health risks, 
and overall cost to the system. There are two ways to frame and answer 
the objection. The fi rst way the objection might be presented would be 
an individual sense. The answer to this form resides in the arguments 
provided here involving informed consent. 
 The second has to do with the balance of harms and benefi ts as spread 
across all affected, making it essentially a problem of distributive jus-
tice. White, wealthy men are currently harmed by medical overtesting, 
but black women would be harmed if certain solutions to overtesting 
are implemented. In order to avoid rehashing debates over the nature 
of distributive justice, consider how one infl uential conception balances 
the harms. Following Rawls, “Social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefi t of the least 
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached 
to offi ces and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity” ( 1988 , 266). Notice that the overall benefi ts here do not 
favor the least advantaged. The least advantaged here (racial minori-
ties) would instead be  harmed by blunt solutions to overtesting. Thus, it 
would be impermissible under Rawlsian distributive justice principles to 
implement solutions to overtesting that have this deleterious effect. 44, 45
 Another popular conception of distributive justice is utilitarian. Here, 
the question faced is just the cost to the system at large if overtesting is 
maintained. Although the current health-care system is extremely expen-
sive, it is not clear that overtesting is even close to being one of the most 
signifi cant factors. In a commissioned report, the University of Virginia 
Miller Center found nine of the most signifi cant drivers of health-care 
costs in the United States. Although overuse of CT scans was men-
tioned (about double the average of other developed countries), it is only 
mentioned briefl y as part of a much larger phenomenon of Americans 
assuming expensive treatments are the same as higher-quality treatments 
( Thomasian 2014 ). Berwick and Hackbarth identify six ways to reduce 
the huge fi nancial cost of medical overuse. Medical testing is mentioned 
just once: as an example of pricing failures ( 2012 ). 46 But, even if overt-
esting turned out to be a signifi cant driver of health-care costs, there are 
many other costs that could be reformed before overtesting that would 
not correspondingly cause further harm to communities of color. 47
AuQ15
AuQ16
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 There might be a fi nal concern of achievability. Perhaps the other driv-
ers of health-care costs are simply unachievable relative to lesser costs 
like overtesting. 48 But this does not bear out in the reports of the authors 
writing about the drivers of health-care costs. First, the primary drivers of 
health-care costs are  so expensive that “achieving even a fraction of that 
amount in the short run” could result in serious savings, stability, and 
prevent harm to patients ( Berwick and Hackbarth 2012 , 1515). There 
are also state-based alternatives laid out in other reports of a similar 
kind, with specifi c steps and recommendations for cutting these drivers 
of costs ( Thomasian 2014 ). As noted before, these need only be mildly 
successful to compare very favorably with reform efforts in overtesting. 
If we are going to focus our solutions due to limited resources, it makes 
sense to cut out issues that are uncontroversially bad before turning to 
other, more controversial issues. 
 Some Helpful Advances 
 The case against unnecessarily testing patients for conditions is intuitive 
and widely accepted. It is also wrong. Once we keep the history of medi-
cal racism in mind, we see that our climate of overtesting is surprisingly 
benefi cial to communities of color in two ways: (1) it prevents common-
place cases of perceived overtesting from greatly harming the patient, and 
(2) even in cases where testing is actually unwarranted, it restores trust 
between the medical community and black people in America as well as 
avoiding harm caused by perceptions of withholding treatment. Objec-
tions to overtesting usually overlook important explanatory features of 
the medical industry. The nature of overtesting harms and benefi ts are 
misconstrued or undertheorized. Similarly, the compromised epistemic 
position of physicians when determining whether a certain test is nec-
essary is often missed, both in a contemporary and historical context. 
Finally, there are several other uncontroversially bad problems that could 
be solved before addressing problems such as overtesting, which has 
noteworthy benefi ts for communities of color. Therefore, the distribu-
tions of benefi ts and harms give us a powerful reason to retain our cur-
rent climate of overtesting. 
 My argument does not preclude solutions to overtesting; it merely 
demands that they be nuanced such that the race-specifi c harms associ-
ated with blunt discouragement are not present. There is extensive litera-
ture on the risks and benefi ts of tailoring policies with race as a variable 
( King 1992 ;  Osborne and Feit 1992 ;  Comstock, Castillo, and Lindsay 
2004 ; Kaplan and Bennett 2003;  King 2007 ;  Bonilla-Silva 2017 ). It dis-
tinguishes between “race-neutral” or “colorblind” policies that do not 
use race as a variable and “race-conscious” policies, which do. Patricia 
King argues that race-conscious policies risk reifying racial stereotypes 
but are often the only policies that can properly address racial inequalities 
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( King 1992 ,  2007 ). She proposes some criteria for acceptable race-con-
scious policies: they should be short-term in nature and no broader in 
scope than their use demands ( King 2007 ). Moving forward, likely some 
mix of race-conscious and race-neutral solutions should be carefully con-
sidered. Some piecemeal race-neutral solutions that appear to suffi ciently 
address my concerns are already popping up, such as specialty-specifi c 
waste analyses documenting the most-used and least-useful tests. 49
 More race-conscious reforms might look like feedback-focused 
attempts to close racial gaps in testing and diagnosis. Solutions as sim-
ple as recording the race, ethnicity, and gender of each patient of a pro-
vider, running analyses to see if there are gaps along those lines, and 
then providing the medical professional with their results appear to work 
well in the studies led by Hannan ( Hannan et al. 2010 ,  2014 ,  2018 ). 
This sort of feedback could be mandated, and even fi nancial penalties 
assessed if disparities continue. This would parallel the signifi cant success 
of a similar policy of mandated measurement of hospital and physician 
quality of care by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ( U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services 2018 ). 50 Another promising 
alternative are the community-based participatory research models that 
have shown some success at reducing racial and ethnic health disparities 
( Stone, Wallerstein, Garcia, and Winkler 2014 ). These and other nuanced 
solutions would work toward ending overtesting without the race-spe-
cifi c harms other common solutions to overtesting threaten. 
 Overtesting has been thought of as uncontroversially bad, but I have 
argued that the downsides of the current sentiment to reduce overtesting 
have unacceptable consequences due to the phenomenon of perceived 
overtesting. Furthermore, it may have signifi cant and surprising bene-
fi ts, such as restoring trust between the medical community and racial 
minorities. Therefore, even assuming overtesting is a signifi cant driver 
of health-care costs, we should focus our attention elsewhere before 
advocating for the elimination of overtesting from the health-care sys-
tem. This is especially true if we have no suffi ciently nuanced alternative 
proposal to restore trust between communities of color and communities 
of medicine and prevent the medical error that regularly occurs due to 
racial biases in the medical fi eld. Still, there are solutions that avoid the 
worries presented here, usually by adapting race-neutral proposals into 
race-conscious proposals, or by building policies by beginning with the 
fact of racial disparities. Regardless, the discussion around overtesting 
must change. 
 Notes 
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 2.  For more on medical error, see Allhoff (2019); Makary and Daniel (2016); 
and Kohn, Corrigan, and Donaldson (2000). Medical racism, both conscious 
and unconscious, causes much harm to minority communities. Recently, 
medical error due to racial bias has been emphasized (Schulman et al. 1999; 
Hoberman 2012; Staton et al. 2007). 
 3.  See also Carter et al. (2015). 
 4.  It can also be made consistent by reading both concepts as objective, but 
this leaves us without much epistemic access to cases of overuse and medi-
cal bases. For instance, if it is in fact the case that calcium and vitamin D 
supplements are not working as well as expected, then all such treatments 
count as overuse, despite the medical community’s ignorance. This is not 
intuitive. Instead, we seem to be pursuing the idea that there is some gap 
between knowledge and practice that should be closed. This gap can present 
at a personal and community level: a physician might know calcium supple-
ments do not work well and yet still prescribe them or there might be fi nd-
ings of this nature and yet the community has not taken steps to ensure all 
its members follow best known practices. There are further issues, like how 
we would begin to know the extent of overuse, since it depends on having 
perfect knowledge. 
 5.  More will be said on this topic in the titular section of the chapter. I thank 
an anonymous reviewer and the editors of the KIEJ for pushing me to 
clarify this. 
 6.  This is incredibly hard to fi nd recent data on. Computed tomography scan 
usage certainly rose into 2007, but the rates are unclear afterwards (Larson 
et al. 2011). Recent studies are piecemeal and often department specifi c, but 
it appears that usage has leveled off or decreased recently (Niles et al. 2017). 
Regardless, the goals of anti-overtesting policies are to affect individual prac-
tice in some way, so presumably this can be assumed. 
 7.  In what follows, I will focus largely on black Americans. It is important to 
acknowledge that minority experience can vary widely based on appearance, 
culture, and ethnicity, and so some of what is true about medical racism for 
black Americans will not be true for other minority groups. I do not have the 
space to defend each generalization from black American experience to other 
minority groups, so the reader is justifi ed in rejecting any such generaliza-
tions. I am confi dent that if the argument is successful for black Americans, 
then generalizing to other minorities will only be a reason  a forteriori . 
 8.  For more on how health inequities are an extension of racial power dynamics 
to this day, see Airhihenbowan and Liburd (2006). 
 9.  See Byrd and Clayton (2001), Byrd and Clayton (2000), Montagu (1963), 
Lewis (1990), and Drake (1990). 
 10.  They also showed it is affected by gender, but I will focus on race here. One 
point to be made, however, is that the effect of intersectionality is clearly 
evident. Being both black  and female is worse than being only black or only 
female in terms of clinical treatment and outcome. 
 11.  These biases also can be passed down via the elder attending physicians and 
precepting. Certain forms of training, infrastructure changes, feedback, and 
education might correct for this. 
 12.  Principled racism is the explicit belief that one race is better than another. 
Contrast this with harboring negative racial stereotypes, which can coexist 
with genuine affi rmations of racial equality. 
 13.  This might have relevant disanalogies. One is about susceptibility, the other 
about exceptionalism. Furthermore, claims about black athletes are demon-
strable, whereas claims about pain require trust in the reporter. The analogy 
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here is not necessarily affected by these differences—instead, I wish to draw 
attention to the willingness to believe falsities about black bodies in general, 
even in the face of evidence (reported or demonstrable). 
 14.  Some have indicated that this might be due to race being treated as entirely 
biological in the medical literature, or nearly so. See Doll, Snyder, and Ford 
(2018). 
 15.  These are not the only factors that affect health outcome inequities. Social 
disadvantage, class stratifi cation, high health-care needs without correspond-
ing availability of care, systemic racism in other sectors (e.g., environmental 
racism of dumping pollutants and trash), and so on all have major impacts 
on health inequities. For more discussion on these and other possible driv-
ers of health inequities, see King (2007). For more on racial segregation as a 
fundamental source of racial disparities in health, see Williams and Collins 
(2001). For more on how power plays a role in most of these inequities, see 
Airhihenbuwa and Liburd (2006). 
 16.  Some of these other beliefs include thicker skin and blood that coagulates 
more quickly, for instance. The point is less that any one of these explana-
tions explains the phenomena, but that whatever explanation succeeds, it 
will be one that includes false biological beliefs. Alternatives to these false 
biological belief systems are largely unsupported (e.g., that medical person-
nel are consistently interpersonally racist about these matters and prescribing 
too few pain medications to black patients out of malice). 
   This also fi ts in with fi ndings that indicate that overuse and underuse can be 
idiosyncratic to certain diagnoses (Reid, Rabideau, and Sood 2016). Here, 
it seems that heart disease and heart attacks in black people is precisely the 
kind of convergence of symptoms, biases, and practices that add up to sys-
temic overuse or underuse. 
 17.  A similar effect demonstrating racial bias over class-based issues was found 
in Williams (2015). 
 18.  This extends to other spheres—for example, weathering and its effects 
might reduce political activism due to health reasons just when the popula-
tion is likely to become increasingly interested in civic engagement, reducing 
the ability of weathered populations to gain political clout (Kilgore 2018; 
Bound, Geronimus, Rodriguez, and Waidmann 2015). 
 19.  This denial or ignorance of experience is not limited to merely black women. 
Latina women, for example, were the least likely among women with chronic 
or gestational diabetes to be tested for high blood sugar in a post-partum 
visit (Declercq et al. 2013). They were also the most likely to be concerned 
that a medical error would occur around the time of birth and reported that 
they received poor treatment while hospitalized for birth at almost twice the 
rate of white women (although 2 percent lower than black women; Declercq 
et al. 2013). 
 20.  This sort of objection is undermined by certain accounts of systems, institu-
tions, organizations, and communities. When one joins the Ku Klux Klan in 
a suffi ciently serious way, one becomes culpable (in a certain way) as a mem-
ber of that group for that group’s past wrongdoing. This goes both ways. 
Joining a charity group in a suffi ciently serious way earns you praise (in a 
certain way) as a member of that group due to that group’s praiseworthy 
actions. 
 21.  Questions of redress are beyond the scope of this chapter. For discussion, see 
Boxill (2015), Robinson (2000), Horowitz (2003), Coates (2014), and de 
Greiff (2006a, 2006b). 
 22.  At least black people in America, but possibly others. See note 8. 
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 23.  It is important to note that almost all diagnostic evaluations are cases of 
inference to the best explanation and are therefore probabilistic rather than 
all-or-nothing (see Johnson forthcoming). So while it might be the case that a 
physician’s biases lead them so far astray that there would be a complete lack 
of a medical basis for care, it is more likely that most situations involve cases 
in which the physician is forced to make a decision on narrower probabilities. 
 24.  There are other cases that can be constructed for using the same test fewer 
times than the actual situation requires due to decreased prior probability 
from the mistaken evaluation, and so on. 
 25.  I thank an anonymous reviewer for making me think more carefully about 
how to conceptualize overtesting, both perceived and actual. 
 26.  The point made here is very similar to the case study as presented in Krakauer 
and Truog (1997), although the issue is anxiety over harmless symptoms in 
actual overtesting and futile end-of-life care in their case. 
 27.  This general example is meant to parallel the discussion of the black mater-
nal mortality rate and the dismissal of black experiences in the medical fi eld 
discussed previously. 
 28.  Latina women were the least likely of all groups to receive such testing. 
 29.  See note 7. 
 30.  I discuss some of the advances I believe do not trigger these concerns in the 
fi nal section. 
 31.  Cf. Krakauer and Truog (1997). 
 32.  There are interesting issues here regarding the moral luck of such circum-
stances. For more on this topic, see Allhoff (2019). 
 33.  It might be objected that overtesting cannot mitigate undertreatment or under-
testing because undertreatment and undertesting exist at the same time as the 
current climate of overtesting. But this does not consider that the climate of 
overtesting may well be mitigating some undertreatment and undertesting  right 
now , and thus the removal of it would expand the reach of undertreatment 
and undertesting. Certainly allowing overtesting to continue will not solve all 
health inequities, but that is not my position. My position is that it may miti-
gate some of the harms of undertesting and the consequent undertreatment. 
 34.  Not all or any net gains, merely some. It might be that there is some arrange-
ment of testing such that harms go down slightly overall but the distribution 
of harms is racialized (e.g., perhaps black people in America experience fewer 
warranted tests than before). This strikes one as  prima facie impermissible. 
 35.  Medical costs are, unfortunately, very opaque in the United States’ health-
care system. This presents a problem of its own, but whose solution is (in 
theory) straightforward: the cost of healthcare in the U.S. should be revised 
to be much clearer; else we are missing out on true informed consent. 
 36.  A successful test is (roughly) a test in which there is a medical basis for the 
test, the test accurately detects whether the condition tested for is present, 
and the condition, if detected, can be well-treated. 
 37.  This would entail our medical industry is a sham; doctors are acting pater-
nalistically while deceiving patients (and the public) into thinking we have a 
say in our treatment. I take this route to be a dead-end. 
 38.  This has a further problem: it seems that racial bias would also work against 
problems of informed consent. This might be alleviated by nuanced solutions 
such as feedback-focused reforms that I mention at the end of the chapter. 
For examples, see Hannan et al. (2010, 2014, 2018). 
 39.  There are also proposals and research done on how to improve communica-
tion through cultural competency among other things, which will in turn 
increase the likelihood of securing informed consent. For more discussion 
and analysis, see Betsch et al. (2016). 
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 40.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and Sandra Borden for pushing me on 
this point. 
 41.  Systems such as single-payer still care about effi ciency; still, it would solve 
the  individual fi nancial case, which is what I focus on here. Costs to the sys-
tem at large will be addressed shortly. 
 42.  This is particularly true for Rawlsian arguments for universal health-care 
access (Rawls 1988). For example, consider premise three in Daniels (2017): 
 Various socially controllable factors contribute to maintaining normal 
functioning in a population and distributing health fairly in it, including 
traditional public health and medical interventions, as well as the distribu-
tion of such social determinants of health as income and wealth, educa-
tion, and control over life and work. 
 The social determinants of health mentioned would include racial aspects 
such as past injustices and physicians holding false beliefs due to cul-
tural stereotyping and institutional racism (Hoberman 2012). Thus, the 
analysis given here would strongly support a crucial premise in Daniels’s 
argument. 
 Deborah Stone takes this in a slightly different direction, arguing that 
something like market ideology guarantees racial inequality. For more, see 
Stone (2005). 
 43.  Here I assume something like Rawls’s Difference Principle (Rawls 1988). 
Political theory and philosophy are beyond the scope of this chapter, and 
those disagreeing with the Difference Principle or something like it may sim-
ply disagree with me here. 
 44.  This leaves open the possibility of a system that only overtests minority 
groups as a solution. I take this to be an ineffective solution for two reasons: 
(1) it seems impossible to implement the solution without having to address 
the very problems causing the problem in the fi rst place and (2) the shift to 
race-conscious solutions is more likely to fall in favor of the solutions stud-
ied by Hannan et al. (2010, 2018) mentioned at the end of the chapter with 
much less resistance and greater effect. 
 45.  A forteriori , if one is convinced of some sort of reparations framework, it is 
entirely possible that the utilitarian calculus weighs against overtesting and 
yet we  still ought to keep it due to the origin of the problem (racism) and the 
parties being harmed and benefi tting from the system. 
 46.  American imaging is priced to be several times more than identical proce-
dures in other countries (International Federation of Health Plans 2010). 
 47.  For examples, see Berwick and Hackbarth (2012). 
 48.  Thanks to T.J. Broy for this objection. 
 49.  Some of the waste noted in the updates by Daniel Morgan and company 
might also qualify. 
 50.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer who pointed me to this sort of solution. 
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